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AGENcy-ILLEGAL CONTRACT-IMPLIED AUTHORiTY.-RIKARDS V. RICK-
.Ds, 56 ATL. 397 (MD.).-An agent appointed to sell a horse sold it in
violation of the Sunday laws. The principal sued in replevin on the ground
that the agent had no authority to sell illegally. Held, that such sale was
within the scope of the agent's authority and the principal is bound.
It is well settled that authority to commit a criminal act will never be
inferred. Pearce v. Foote, 113 Ill. 228; Clark v. Metropolitan Bank, 3 Duer
(N. Y.) 241. In civil cases the principal's liability depends on whether the
act is within the scope of the agent's authority. A railroad company is liable
where the conductor illegally puts a passenger off the train. B. & Y. Turn-
pike Co. v. Boone, 45 Md. 344. And in England where a party, authorized
to get information, gets it illegitimately his partner is liable, Hamlyn v.
Houston & Co., L. R. (19o3) I K. B. 8r. But an agent, employed to make a
loan, has no implied authority to make it usurious. Condit v. Baldwin, 21
N. Y. :21. And in Arnot v. Pitson, etc., R. Co., 5 Th. & C. (N. Y.) 143, it
was decided that, where an act may be done legally, authority in the agent
to do it illegally will not ordinarily be presumed. Generally, however, such
acts as that of the agent in the principal case would very likely be held to
be impliedly authorized.
APPEAL AND ERROR-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REVIEW-IsSUEs FIRST
RAISED IN APPE.ATE CouRT.-CooK v. Am. E. C. & ScHuLTz GUNPOwDER
Co., 56 AT. 114 (N. J.) In an action for death of plaintiff's intestate
charged to negligence of defendant while such intestate was in defendant's
employ, verdict was rendered for plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant showed
that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, but plaintiff sought to sustain
the verdict on a contention that defendant had rendered the place of intestate's
employment dangerous without intestate's knowledge. Held, that the verdict
cannot be sustained on the theory that, in the absence of negligence of this
character, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict on some other ground not
submitted to the jury's determination.
A plaintiff's verdict cannot be sustained on a theory of law antagonistic
to that upon which the case was tried. To do so, upon a rule to show cause,
would be to deprive defendant of his right to have the judgment of the
court of last resort upon the soundness of that theory, as applied to the
facts of the case. DeRaismes v. DeRaismes, 56 Atl. i7O. When in a civil
case no request is made, the mere omission to charge upon a particular point
is not ground of error. Fox v. Fox, 96 Pa. St 60; Phila. & R. R. Co. v.
Getz, 113 Pa. St. 214. It is the constitutional right of every citizen to have
his case reviewed, in one form or another, by a court of error. Ringgold's
Case, I Bland 5 (Md.). This is impossible where a supreme court first
settles an issue. But where both parties raise such issue on appeal, though
neither raised it in lower court, such court may make it a basis of decision.
Summerson v. Hicks, i42 Pa. St. 344.
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BANKRUPTCY-COMPOSiTrION-OPERATION AND EFFzcT-CLAIm NoT SCHED-
uLED.-IN RE LANE, ii Am. B. R_ 136 (D. C.)-A creditor inadvertently failed
to prove his claim within a year of the adjudication. The bankrupt, in good
faith and "under almost unavoidable circumstances," had omitted the debt
from his schedule. Over a year after composition proceedings the creditor
sought payment of his claim from the surplus left in the hands of the court.
Held, that after composition proceedings any surplus remaining belongs to
the bankrupt, and does not enure to unpaid creditors as in simple bankruptcy
proceedings, unless such creditors prove their claims within the year a-lowed
by statute.
Sec. 57n of the Act of 1898, that "claims shall not be proved against a
bankrupt estate subsequent to one year after the adjudication," applies to
compositions as rigorously and explicitly as to other bankruptcy proceedings,
and no exception can be made for innocently delayed creditors. In re Brown,
123 Fed. 336; io Am. B. R. 588. This feature of the Act of i898 appears
novel and questionable. Under the Act of June 22, 1874, creditors whose
names, addresses and debts were not placed on the bankrupt's schedule were
held not bound by the composition proceedings. In re Becket, Fed. Cas. 1,210;
2 Woods 173. In re Blackmore, ii Fed. 412. A creditor whose address is
stated to be unknown in bankrupt's proposal of composition, is not bound
by the composition. Harrison v. Gamble, 69 Mich. 96. A bankrupt lessee
of a trustee placed in his schedule the amount of rent due, with name and
address of the cestui. On suit afterward brought by the trustee for rent due
before bankruptcy, the composition was held no bar. MacMahon v. Jacobs,
129 Mass. 524.
BANKRUPTcY-PREFERENCES-BANK DEosiTs.--NEw YORK BANK v.
MAssEY, 24 Sup. CT. igg.-Insolvents, indebted to a bank, made deposits
therein subject to check, shortly afterwards filing a petition in bankruptcy.
Held, that, as the deposits did not amount to a transfer of property equivalent
to a preference, the transaction was not within 57g of the Bankruptcy Act,
providing that the claims of creditors who have received preferences shall not
be allowed unless such preferences be surrendered. McKenna, J., dissenting.
This decision, which reverses the ruling of the circuit court and is
directly contrary to the only other adjudication in point, In re Kellar, no
Fed. 348, is based upon the relationship of debtor and creditor created by a
bank deposit, sec. 68a of the Bankruptcy Act stipulating that mutual debts
or credits shall be accounted and the balance allowed. In Pirie v. Trust Co.,
182 U. S. 438, the word "transfer," as used in the Act, was construed in its
most comprehensive sense, the court deciding that it included every means by
which propertY, can pass from one's ownership or possession; and, under
sec. 6oa a transfer will amount to a preference if it be prejudicial to other
creditors of the same class. Tle ruling in the main case allows a creditor
bank to prove its claims on the same footing with other creditors, notwith-
standing it previously may have appropriated the deposited assets of the
insolvent. The distinction which the court draws between transfers for the
sole benefit -of the creditor and those creating an obligation in favor of the
bankrupt is incontrovertible. It is also true that the obtaining by the credit6r
of a greater percentage of his debt is an indirect result of the transfer, and
not included within the strict letter of the Act; but can it be denied that it
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is within its spirit? It would appear that the position taken, while sustainable
in theory, is in derogation of justice and inconsistent with legislative intent.
CARRIERs-DELIERY OF MACHINE-NEGLIGENT DELAY-MEASURE or
DAMAGE.-PACKET Co. v. BoTIRoFF, 77 S. W. 920 (Ky.).-In an action against
a carrier for damages for negligent delay in the delivery of a machine, held,
that the measure of damages should include loss of profits.
In a number of cases it has been held that anticipated profits, being
inherently speculative and uncertain, may not be included in the measure of
damages for a breach of contract. The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546; Free-
man v. Clute, 3 Barb. 424; Wright v. Mulvaney, 78 Wis. 89; McKnight v.
Ratcliff, 44 Pa. St. i56. But the question as to what would be the rule if
the anticipated profits were free from the element of uncertainty, is not
discussed in these cases. In the leading English case it was held that
anticipated profits are not recoverable as damages, except where such profits
are not open to the objection of uncertainty or remoteness, or where it may
be reasonably presumed that they were within the intent and understanding
of both parties at the time the contract was entered into; Hadley v. Baxen-
dale, 9 Exch. 341. This case has been generally approved and followed in
this country, and enunciates the accepted doctrine on this subject; Howard v.
Manufacturing Co., 139 U. S. x9; Crawford v. Parsons, 63 N. H. 438;
Stewart v. Patton, 65 Mo. App. 21; Boom Co. v. Prince, 34 Minn. 7i; Howe
Machine Co. v. Bryson, 44 Ia. i59. There have been comparatively few cases
where the courts have found anticipated profits sufficiently free from remote-
ness and uncertainty to be included in the measure of damages for a breach
of contract. Crawford v. Parsons, supra; Schile v. Brokholms, 8o N. Y. 614.
CITIZENSHIP--STATUS OF PORTO RIcANS-ImMIGRATIoN.-GONzALES V.
WILLIAMS, 24 SUP. CT. 177.-Held, that a Porto Rican, a native of the island
at the time of its cession to the United States, was not an alien within the
meaning of the Immigration Act of i89i, providing for the detention and
deportation of alien immigrants likely to become public charges.
The court refused to recognize the contention that the cession of Porto
Rico accomplished the naturalization of its people; that, under the act of
x9oo, Porto Ricans necessarily became citizens of the United States; but
based its opinion upon the test of alienage alone. Chief Justice Fuller,
delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We think it clear that the Act
(Immigration Act of i89i) relates to foreigners as respects this country,
to persons owing allegiance to a foreign government, and citizens or subjects
thereof; and that citizens of Porto Rico, whose permanent allegiance is due
to the United States; who live in the place of the dominion of the United
States; the organic law of whose domicile was enacted by the United States,
and is enforced through officials sworn to support the United States consti-
tution,-are not 'aliens,' and upon their arrival by water at the ports of our
mainland are not 'alien immigrants' within the intent and meaning of the
Act of i89i." By the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, Porto Rico ceased to be a foreign country within the mean-
ing of the tariff laws. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. I; and Porto Rican
vessels were nationalized as vessels of the United States by virtue of the Act
of I90. Huns v. S. S. Co., 182 U. S. 392.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LIBERTY OF CONTRACT-SALES OF MERCHANDISE IN
BULK-NoTICE To CREDTORS.-SQIERs v. TELLIER, 69 N. E. 312 (MAS.).-A
statute providing that a sale of merchandise in bulk, other than in the ordinary
course of business, is void unless seller and purchaser make an inventory and
the latter notify creditors of the former of the sale and its condition. Held,
not unconstitutional as infringing on liberty of contract.
Similar statutes have recently been held constitutional in many of the
States. Wills v. Yates, 12 S. W. 233; Neas v. Borches, 71 S. W. 5o; Mc-
Daniels v. Shoe Co., 6o L R. A. 947. While the principle of the police power
cannot render good legislation which without reason or justice deprives one
of liberty of contract; Chicago v. Netcher, 55 N. E. 7o7; Young v. Comm.,
45 S. E. 327, it has nevertheless been extended broadly, The Slaughterhouse
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, and its limits are hard to define. It is evident that
statutes such as the one in question are aimed at a particularly common kind
of fraud, and are not arbitrary legislation, certainly not class legislation,
Comm. v. Danyiger, 176 Mass. 29o; and come clearly under the police power
as it is now construed. See IX Virginia Law Register, 682.
CRIMINAL LAW-NEW TRIAL--NEWLy DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.-STATE V.
NELSON, 97 N. W. 652 (MINNl.)-Held, that new trials should be granted in
criminal cases on the ground of newly discovered evidence only where it is
reasonably clear that the new evidence would be likely to change the result.
Lewis, J., dissenting.
Some courts distinguish between civil and criminal cases in regard to
granting new trials; though as a general rule the practice is the same in
both. Eldridge v. Minn. & St. Louis R. R. Co., 32 Minn. 252; Grayson v.
Commonwealth, 6 Grat. 712. Though there is much conflict in the cases theprincipal case seems to be supported by the weight of authority. Parker V.
Hardy, 24 Pick. 246; Moore v. State, 96 Tenn. 209; Eberhart v. State, 47
Ga. 598. The rulings in many cases recklessly granting new trials on techni-
calities, etc., have done much to increase the delay of litigation and to
encourage defiant criminality. See the dissenting opinions of Whitfield, I.,in Lipscomb v. State, 75 Minn. 559, and of Haight, J., in People v. Koerner,
154 N. Y. 355. The dissenting judge in the principal case contends that in
criminal cases motion for a new trial should not be denied where there is a
possibility that the new evidence might affect the'verdict. This view is sup-
ported by Green v. State, 17 Fla. 66g; People v. Williams, 18 Cal. 187; Dennis
v. State, 1o3 Lud. 142.
DEATH-PREsuMPTIoN-TITLE-SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE.-MCNULTY V.
MITCHELL, 84 N. Y. Supr. 89.-The purchaser of property at a partition sale
refused to take title on the ground that there was no evidence of the death
of one to whom or to whose issue if living, the entire property would belong.
This person forty-three years ago was unmarried and has been unheard of
since that time. Held, that the purchaser should be compelled to take the
title.
The law does not recognize the impossibility of one living in 1034 to be
still living in 1827. Best, Evidence, See. 4o8; Duke of Cumberland v. Graves,9 Barb. 6o8. The presumption of death is prima facie merely and shotild
absentee return, the purchaser's title would be defeated. Young v. Heffner,
,36 Ohio St. 237. In some States a century must elapse before death will be
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presumed. Burney v. Ball, 24 Ga. 505; Owens V. Mitchell, 5"Mart. (La.) 668.
Although it is a settled rule of law that a purchaser will not be compelled
to take a doubtful title there is some conflict as to what degree of doubt will
relieve the purchaser. Best, Ev., p. 502. If the uncertainty of the title affects
its marketable value, specific performance will not be decreed. Vreeland v.
Blauvelt, 23 N. J. Eq. 485; 3 Pars., Cont. (6th ed.), 380. In some cases the
test is whether the doubt is a reasonable one. Fleming v. Burnham, IOO N. Y.
I; Dingley v. Bon, 13o N. Y. 614. The principal case is supported by Ferry
v. Sampson, 112 N. Y. 418, but this case is considerably limited by Vought v.
Williams, 12o N. Y. 26o.
EQUITY-ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS.-
CABLE V. INSURANCE CO., 24 SUP. CT. 74.-An action was instituted in a State
court to recover on a policy of life insurance. The company filed a bill in
equity, in federal jurisdiction, asking cancellation of the policy on the ground
of fraud, alleging an inadequate legal remedy because of the administration
in the State courts of laws unduly adverse to insurance companies and
because a removal to the federal courts of the action brought against them
would, under a State statute, subject them to a revocation of their license.
Held, that the inadequacy of legal remedy alleged was not sufficient to warrant
the federal courts of equity in assuming jurisdiction. Harlan and White,
JJ., dissenting.
Although the company, in removing the original suit to the federal courts,
might suffer a forfeiture of their license, the court reasoned that, as the
contingency was one of the complainant's own creation, they could not avail
themselves of it as a foundation for equitable relief. There is a well defined
tendency, however, to relax the strictness of the doctrine followed. Assur.
Co. v. Ry. Co., 20 Law F. 422; Smyth v. Ames, i69 U. S. 466; Sullivan, v.
Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806; Bank v. Stone, 88 Fed. 383, holding that equity
can be refused only when the relief at law is -as practical and efficient to the
ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity. That
the company would suffer irreparable injury by a forfeiture of its license is
incontrovertible. It is true that it might adopt the alternative of defending
the original suit, but at the expense of renouncing an equitable basis of relief.
Perhaps the doctrine most consistent with the principles of equity is that
supported in the minority opinion.
EXCHANGES-PROPERTY RIGHT IN QUOTATIONS-PRoTECTION IN EQUITY.-
CHRISTIE GRAIN & STOCK Co. v. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 125 FED. 161 (C.
C. A.).-An Illinois statute makes it a crime for any person to keep a
"bucket shop" or any place wherein is permitted the buying or selling of
stocks or produce without the intention of actual delivery, and provides that
any person or corporation who shall communicate quotations with a view
to su6h transactions shall be considered an accomplice. Held, that, although
the rules of the board of trade forbid dealing in futures, where the evidence
shows that 85 per cent. of its transactions were in actual violation of these
rules and of the statute, equity will not protect the property right of the
board of trade in its quotations.
It is well established that a stock exchange has a qualified property right
in its quotations. Marine, etc., Ex. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 22 Fed. 23; Com. Tel.
Co. v. Smith, 47 Hun. 494; Live Stock Com. Co. v. Live Stock Ex., 143 Ill.
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2io. But equity will not permit gambling in stock quotations. Bryant v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 17 Fed. 825. What effect rules of a board of trade forbidding
dealing in futures may have toward relieving its quotations from taint of
immorality, has given rise to a conflict of decisions. The earlier decisions
seldom withheld the protection of equity; Metropolitan, etc., Ex. v. Chicago
Board of Trade, i5 Fed. 847; and the Circuit Court, in the case under con-
sideration, held that such rules presumptively free a board of trade from
the charge of being a party to any illegal transactions upon its floors. A
stipulation in the contract for delivery has the same effect. Beadles v. Mc-
Elrath, 85 Ky. 23o. But in Board of Trade v. O'Dell, 115 Fed. 574, and in
Board of Trade v. Donovan, 121 Fed. ioim, it was held that where the evidence
shows that the greater part of the transactions of a board of trade involve
no delivery, the intention to permit dealing in futures must be presumed, and
prohibitory rules which are not enforced will not be permitted in equity to
screen the real nature of the transactions. The present decision concludes a
long line of conflict and places stock exchanges, where the majority of the
trade is in futures, on the same basis as bucket shops.
INJuNcTioN-RAoAD TICKars-SALE BY BROxEas.-RAiLwAy Co. v.
REEVES, 85 N. Y. Supp. 28.-Held, that where defendants purchased the return
portions of non-transferable round trip tickets from the original holders
and resold them, thereby defrauding the railroad company, injunction would
not be to restrain this traffic.
A statute forbidding the sale of railway tickets by others than the duly
authorized agents of the company is unconstitutional. Tyroler v. Warden, 157
N. Y. 1I6. This, however, is not the prevailing view and the contrary has
been held in several States. State v. Corbett, 57 Minn. 345; Burdick V. Peo-
ple, 149 Ill. 6oo; Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552. The contract of the railway
company and the original purchaser in this case was that the ticket should be
non-transferable, and a third party who wilfully induces one to break a con-
tract is liable therefor to the party injured. Angel v. Railway Co., isr U. S.
i; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385. A railway company is entitled to an in-
junction to prevent ticket brokers buying the return portions of non-trans-
ferable, round trip tickets from the original purchasers and re-selling them.
Railway Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65.
INTERNAL REVENUE-OLEOMARGARINE.-BRAUN & FiTTs v. COYNE, 126
FED. 331.-Held, that a food product made of leaf lard and beef fat, bathed
in salt water to take away fat odor, but not being artificially colored or
flavored, though sold in pound packages, is not taxable as oleomargarine.
Oleomargarine is usually defined as a product or compound made wholly
or partly out of any fat, oil or oleaginous substance. Cook v. State, io Ala.
4o. But there is doubt whether a statute to regulate or prohibit the manu-
facture of oleomargarine on any other ground than to prevent a fraud on the
public through the imitation of butter, would be constitutional. State v.
Marx, 99 N. Y. 377; Ex parte Virginia, Ioo U. S. 339. Although Powell v.
Penn., 127 U. S. 678, would seem to hold otherwise. But possibly because of
the doubtful validity of statutes based upon any other ground, the courts have
usually interpreted them as merely intended to prevent fraud. People v.
Arensberg, lO5 N. Y. 123; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. This case sus-
tains this view, and, since the compound under consideration could hardly
lead to fraud, it is relieved from taxation.
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LnBL-NEwsPAPERs-PUNITIVE DAMAGES-LIABILITY OF OWNER FOR AcTs
OF MANAGER.-CRANE v. BENNETT, 69 N. E. 274 (N. Y.).-Where a newspaper
publishes a libel with aggravating circumstances, held, that the owner is liable
in punitive damages for acts committed by his manager in his absence.
In general, it is recognized that acts done by an employe cannot ordinarily
render the employer liable in punitive damages, Hagan v. R. R., 3 R. I. 38;
Cleghorn v. R. R., 56 N. Y. 44, the necessary malice being absent. This is
not. however, the uniform rule; Canfield v. R. R., 59 Mo. App. 354; Fell v.
Northern.Pac. R. R., 48 Fed. 248. The principal case follows the dissenting
opinion in Samuels v. Evening Mail Ass'n., 9 Hun. 288, 294, afterward affirmed
by the New York Court of Appeals, 75 N. Y. 6o4. It being thoroughly settled
that the proprietor of a newspaper is liable in compensatory damages for any
tort committed by it in his absence; Curtis v. Muzzy, 6 Gray 251. It would
seem that where the proprietor has so thoroughly alienated the business from
his control, and has put himself away from all oversight, he should be re-
sponsible for the conduct of the business so delegated to his manager, in the
same extent as if he himself published the libel.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONs-NEw PROMIsE-AcKNOWLEDGMENT BY AGENT-
PROMISSORY NOTE.-DERAisMES v. DERAIsMEs, 56 Am- 170 (N. J.).-Held,
that under a statute requiring that an acknowledgment, to defeat the operation
of limitations, must be in writing, signed by the party chargeable thereby, a
written promise to pay a note by an agent of the person to be bound thereby
is insufficient.
Before Lord Tenterden's Act requiring signature of the person chargeable,
an acknowledgment by a wife was sufficient, when the wife had been accus-
tWmed to act as agent of her husband in his business generally. Anderson v.
Sanderson, 9 Stark 2o4; Holt 591. So, in an action against a husband for
goods supplied to his wife, a letter written by the wife acknowledging the
debt was admissible to take the case out of the statute Gregory v. Parker,
i Camp. 394. But after Lord Tenterden's Act, an acknowledgment contained
in a letter written by the wife of a debtor, in his name and at his request,
was insufficient, because the statute gave no authority to -an agent to make
acknowledgment. Hyde v. fohnson, 3 Scott 289; 2 Bing. N. C. 776. Yet
where an agent had been employed to pay money ior work done, and the
workmen were referred to him for payment, and he assented to it, an
acknowledgment or a promise by him to pay was sufficient. Burt v. Palmer,
5 Esp. 145. The principal case seems to indicate the need for an amendment
in New Jersey permitting acknowledgment of debts by duly authorized agents,
as allowed by the act of i9 and 2o Vict., c. 97.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-AssuMPTION OF RIsK.-
MussER LAND, LOGGING & MFG. Co. v. BROWN, 126 FED. 41 (C. C. A.).-
Plaintiff was employed in unloading logs from a sled on which they were
bound with a chain, which plaintiff loosened by knocking out a hook with an
ax. He requested an ax with a longer handle, and the foreman promised
one, telling him to continue his work until the other ax could be provided.
Held, that, in full knowledge of the danger, he assumed the risk, which
precluded his recovery.
The gist of the question involved is whether, despite a promise of the
master to supply a tool not defective and a request that the employe continue
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in the service until that could be done, the danger was so obvious and immi-
nent as to render the servant liable for contributory negligence. It is well
settled that a servant who knowingly undertakes a hazardous work, assumes
the risk. Coal Co. v. Jones, 127 Ill. 379; Welton v. Railroad Co., 72 M'ass.
555. But there is great conflict of decisions as to how far a promise on the
part of the master to repair and a request that the servant continue in the
employment, will relieve the servant, in case of injury caused by the defect,
from a charge of contributory negligence. In Erdman v. Steel Co., 95 Wis. 6,
and Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., v. Watson, 114 Ind. 2o, it is held that a
servant is relieved from all liability, except when he continues in an employ-
ment so fraught with perils that a man of ordinary prudence would not
undertake it. Other cases hold that a promise to repair shifts all liability
upon the master, except when it should be obvious to the employe that to
continue the work meant imminent, if not inevitable, injury. Green v. Rail-
road Co., 31 Minn. 248; Rothenberg v. N. W. Consol. Mfg. Co., 57 Minn. 461;
Dells Lumber Co. v. Erickson, 25 C. C. A. 397; Hough v. Railway Co., ioo
U. S. 213. The justifiability of the servant in remaining in the employment,
after a promise to repair, is generally held to be a question for the jury.
Lynch v. Allyn, i6o Mass. 249; Smith v. Backus Lumber Co., 64 Minn. 447;
Hough v. Railway Co., supra; Woods on Master and Servant, Secs. 378-381.
The same rule is followed in England. Clark v .Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937.
Thus the decision under consideration, in holding that the case should have
been taken from the jury, would seem to rest on doubtful ground.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES-FELLOW SERVANT.-DoNNELLY v. MIN-
ING Co., 77 S. W. 130 (Mo.).-Held, that a foreman in charge of a crew of
miners is not a fellow servant with the men while taking part in their work,
so as to relieve the master from the liability of his negligence in doing the
work.
In an Indiana case where the circumstances were very similar to those
in the principal case, the court held that the negligence was that of a fellow
servant. Stone Co. v. Chastain, 9 Ind. App. 453. And this is in harmony
with the accepted doctrine that the employer is not liable to the employe
for the negligence of a superintendent in doing the work of a co-employe,
the liability arising only where such negligence occurs in the exercise of
superintendence. Quinn v. Lighterage Co., 23 Fed. 363; Crispin v. Babbitt,
81 N. Y. 516; Hontford v. Railroad Co., 91 Wis. 374; Legrone v. Railroad
Co., 67 Miss. 592. In England it is provided under the Employers' Liability
Act of 188o that where a workman is injured through the negligent act of a
superintendent, damages may be recovered from the employer in those cases
only where it is shown that the negligence occurred in the exercise of super-
intendence. Similar statutes have been enacted in several of the States in
this country. But decisions consonant with that in the principal case and
against the weight of authority have been rendered in Shumway v. Manu-
facturing Co., 98 Mich. 411; Sweeney v. Railroad Co., 84 Tex. 433.
MUNCIPAL Co0PoATIoNs-DcFEcrE SiDEwALK-NOTiCE.-MCMANUS V.
CITY oF WATERTOWx, 84 N. Y. SurP. 638.-A municipal charter required
actual notice of defects in the sidewalk as a pre-requisite to an action for
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injuries caused thereby. Held, that evidence showing that an officer to whom
notice would be sufficient had passed the place several days before the accident
occurred was not sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury of actual notice.
Williams, J., dissenting.
This case follows the decision in Smith v. Rochester, 79 Hun. i74. But it
is difficult to harmonize these cases with the decisions on what constitutes
actual notice. The term "actual notice" is sometimes used in the broad sense
of constructive notice. Am. & Eng. Enzc. Law, Vol. 21, p. 582. By the
weight of authority the requirement of actual notice is satisfied whenever the
authorities by reasonable diligence might have had knowledge. McVee v.
Watertown, 92 Hun. 310; Lyman v. Green Bay, 91 Wis. 488. Some courts lay
down broadly the principle that constructive notice, where the facts are
uncontroverted, is for the court. Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 249; Cla fin v.
Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 306. But the application of this principle to municipal
corporations is opposed to the weight of authority. Todd v. Troy, 61 N. Y.
51o; Decatur v. Besin, i69 Ill. 340.
MUNICIPAL CORRATION-INJI NCTIoN-PRIVArn PARTY AS PLAINTIF.-
AMUSEMENT CO. V. CITY, 74 PAC. 6o6 (KAs.) -The owner of a theatre sought
to restrain city officers from allowing the use of public buildings for lectures
and entertainments for private profit. Held, that his damages differing only
in degree from those sustained by the general public, the action could not be
maintained.
Before a person can maintain an action of this kind, he must show some
interest peculiar to himself. Mikesell v. Durkee, 34 Kas. 5o9; Davis v. New
York, 9 N. Y. Supp. Ct 663. But in the application of this well settled
principle there is considerable conflict. It has repeatedly been held that where
a schoolhouse is used for religious meetings and entertainments an injunction
will be granted against such use on the application of a taxpayer where his
property, books and pencils were injured by such use. School Dist. 17. Wood,
13 Mass. 193; School Dist. v. Arnold, 21 Wis. 657; Spencer v. School Dist.,
15 Kas. 259. In a few cases it has been held that such use of a schoolhouse
might be enjoined at the instance of a taxpayer whose only damage consisted
in the illegal use of the building. Scofield v. School Dist., 27 Conn. 499, and
cases therein cited. The facts in the principal case show a loss of profit
upon the part of the theatre owner which, on its face, is a damage, different
in kind as well as in degree from that suffered by the general public, and
the decision thus seems contrary to the settled weight of authority.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PURCHASE-INCUMBRANCES.-STATE v. To-
PEKA, 74 PAC. 647 (KAs.).-Held, that the city may purchase a system of
waterworks subject to an incumbrance.
The precise question in the principal case is presented for the first time.
Though a municipal corporation may acquire property; Windham v. Port-
land, 4 Mass. 384; and has the right to secure the purchase price by giving a
mortgage; Eddy v. City, 26 La. Ann. 636; it is well settled that a city cannot
dispose of property of a public nature in violation of the trusts upon which
it is held. Dillon, Mun. Corps., sec. 575; Meriwether v. Garret, 1O2 U. S. 472.
Waterworks owned by a city are deemed to be held in trust; New Orleans
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v. Morris, io5 U. S. 6oo; but for the welfare of the city, the mayor and
council were considered to have the power to mortgage the city waterworks
to secure the payment of bonds lawfully issued for the construction of the
same. Adams v. Rome, 59 Ga. 765; Society v. City, 31 Penn. 183; Dillon,
Mun. Corps., Sec. 579. It is upon these grounds that the decision in the
principal case is based.
NEGIGENCE-BoILnR EXPLOSION-INyuRY TO ADJOINING PEMISES.-AN-
DERSON V. HAYS MFG. Co., 56 ATm. 345 (PENN.).-A person employed to inspect
a boiler in a factory negligently overlooked a defect. The boiler exploded
and plaintiff's house was injured. Held, that the owner of the factory, not
being negligent in selecting the inspector, is not liable.
This decision is contrary to the established rule of law that a master
cannot exempt himself from liability for the negligence of his servants by
care in their selection. Even where a man has employed an independent
contractor he is liable for injury from a defect in the work after its com-
pletion and acceptance. Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232; Vogel v. N. Y., 92
N. Y. io. The authorities cited in the present case are those involving either
the fellow-servant doctrine or that of contributory negligence and thus are not
in point. The work had been completed and accepted and the owner would
in most courts have been held liable whatever the relation that existed
between him and the inspector. Cotter v. Lindgren, io6 Cal. 6o2; Khron v.
Brock, I44 Mass. 516.
NOTARY-ACKNOWLEJ-GMENT - INTEREST - DISQUALIFICATION. - BANKING
HousE v. STEwArr, 98 N. W. 34 (NEm.).-Held, that a cashier of a bank,
employed on a fixed salary, is not disqualified to take an acknowledgment to a
mortgage given to the bank,-even though he is related by marriage to the
owner of the bank.
On this question. the law is in conflict, and no rule can be laid down
which will afford a safe test in all cases. The majority of decisions hold that
a person cannot take an acknowledgment of an instrument in which he has an
interest. Wasson v. Connor, 54 Miss. 351; I Cyc. 553. However, unless the
acknowledgment is clearly fraudulent, a person related to the parties may take
it. Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422; i Bouvier, 66-67. A stockholder in a
bank cannot acknowledge a mortgage where the bank is beneficiary. Smith v,.
Clark, ioo Iowa 6o5. But, by the latest decision a stockholder may acknowl-
edge a deed when the corporation is grantor. Read v. Loan Co., 68 Ohio St.
28o. Contra, Bank- v. Spencer, 26 Conn. x95 (1856). Among those disquali-
fied by interest are: partners for co-partners, Bank v. Radtke, 87 Iowa 363;
grantors, Davis v. Beazley, 75 Va. 491. All the leading cases on this subject
as to disqualification of grantees, mortgagees, trustees, beneficiaries, and
cestuis qui trustent, are reviewed in Horbach v. Tyrrel, 48 Neb. 514; Read v.
PLEADING-LIBEL-CopLANT-IDENTIFICATION OF PLAINTIFF.-CORR V.
SUN PRINTING Co., 69 N. E. 288 (N. Y.).-Where a person is libelled imder
the name of Kitty Carr, 35 years of age, and Kate Corr, 26 years of age, brings
suit, held, that section 535 of the Code, providing that it is unnecessary to
state extrinsic facts to show the application of the libelous matter to the
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plaintiff, in the complaint, is not broad enough to render such complaint suf-
ficient. Vann and Martin, JJ., dissenting.
The weight of authority in other States seem to be that it is always suf-
ficient to state generally, in the complaint, that the libel or slander was pub-
lished of the plaintiff, Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59; Wozelka z. Hettrick, 93
N. C. 1o. The principal case resembles Doan v. Kelly, i21 Ind. 413, where,
under a similar provision, a complaint by Louey Kelly was allowed, although
the publication libelled Louise Kelley. The cases in New York are uniformly
more strict, though none is wholly in point. Miller v. Maxwell, 16 Wend. 9,
is a leading case holding that extrinsic facts showing the identity of the
plaintiff must be pleaded. But see, contra, Cook v. Rief, 8 Civ. Proc. R. 133,
where the Code is interpreted so as not to require them.
